Another possible/impossible story: Part-IIIThis is in continuation of:
Another possible/impossible story: Part-II
Keran Sector, Jammu & Kashmir:
The lee side of the hill located at Neelam valley was selected. In the evening hour when the light was fast fading and visibility came down, the tripod was installed at the selected spot. The spot couldn't be located by the Pakistani OP across the border by any means. On the tripod, Col. Ranbir Singh placed the very powerful instrument. This instrument was the newest addition in the inventory of Indian Signal Corps.
The instrument was basically a combination of a receiver and a locator of signals. It could intercept signals, identify the originating position and receiving position upto the accuracy of 15 meters. After installing the instrument, Col. Singh gave a brief training to the young Lieutenant and his JCO from Signals to handle it.
The particular instruments were also installed in other various strategic locations in the entire Jammu region, Kashmir valley and Kargil area. These were also installed in the Pathankot-Gurdaspur-Vikkiwind sector, Narowal-Pagowal axis and Khemkaran-Kasoor axis in Punjab. Lt. General Chatterjee didn't want to take any chance and he covered the entire infiltration-exfiltration routes of the Northern Command and Western Command. The entire installation work was completed at a breakneck speed within three days.
Northern Command HQ War Room, Udhampur:
The War Room of the Northern Command HQ at Udhampur was fully packed. The CGS of the Northern Command, all Corps Commanders and Divisional Commanders under Northern Command were attending the emergency meeting. Lt. General Hooda, GoC-in-C, Northern Command, was chairing the meeting. Lt. General Jagjit Singh, DGMO, and Lt. Gen. Chatterjee, Chief of the Signal Corps, were present. Among the very senior Officers and formation Commanders of Indian Army, Air Commodore Raman, who was the head of the Air Force station at Udhampur, was also present. In the sound-proof War Room, Lt. General Chatterjee explained the entire operation to the assembled Officers. Then Lt. General Hooda and Lt. General Singh divided the entire operation in two parts-intercepting part and offensive part. Particular stress was given on timing: It was repeated again and again that immediately after the completion of intercepting part, offensive action will be initiated.
After the meeting, Lt. General Chatterjee went to the nearby Air Force station along with Air Commodore Raman. Preparation for the offensive part began.
(…. To be continued)